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Of Punctilios and Paybacks:

The Duty of Loyalty
Under the Uniform Trust Code
Karen E. Boxx*
I. INTRODUCTION
Loyalty has been cited as the most desired of traits from those who serve
others. Samuel Goldwyn said, "I'll take fifty percent efficiency to get one
hundred percent loyalty."' Elbert Hubbard put a higher price on loyalty: "Ifput
to the pinch, an ounce of loyalty is worth a pound of cleverness." ' Certainly
Julius Caesar would have agreed with these assessments.3 President Lyndon
Baines Johnson is quoted as saying of a prospective assistant, "I don't want
loyalty. I want loyalty," and continuing with an elaboration of what he meant by
loyalty that is well known but too salty to repeat here.4 One reason that loyalty
is so highly valued is that it is impossible to guarantee and impossible to buy.
The trust law concept ofthe duty of loyalty acknowledges that human nature will
cause any person to favor his or her personal interests over the interests of
another, and it is this assumption of disloyalty that gives rise to the strict
prohibitions of trustee conflicts of interest required under the label of "duty of
loyalty."5

* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law; B.A., University
of New Mexico 1976; J.D., University of Washington 1983.
1.ARTHUR MARX, GOLDWYN: BIOGRAPHY OF THE MAN BEHIND THE MYTH
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(1976).
2. ELBERT HUBBARD, Get Out or Get in Line, in SELECrED WRITINGS OF ELBERT
HUBBARD 59-60 (1928).
3. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR.
4. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972). Of course, others,
from the more cynical world of business, have put a lesser value on loyalty: "The alert
company does not deny the value of loyalty, but values competency more." Eugene E.
Jennings, The Co-Wordly Executive, in MANAGEMENT OF PERSONNEL QUARTERLY
(1971), quoted in QUOTE ITCOMPLETELY! 693 (Eugene C. Gerhart ed., 1998). As to the
potential danger of loyalty, Archibald Cox commented, "Watergate serves as a reminder
that there are limits to the kind of loyalty that is owed and should be given." Justin
Hughes, Cox Reflects on WatergateEra, 77 HARV. L. REC. no. 7, Nov. 18, 1983, at 12.
5. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 227 (2d ed. 1993) ("It is not possible for any person to
act fairly in the same transaction on behalf of himself and in the interest of the trust
beneficiary. It is only human that he will tend to favor his individual interest, whether
consciously or unconsciously, over that of the beneficiary."); Robert W. Hallgring, The
Uniform Trustees 'Powers Act and the Basic Principlesof FiduciaryResponsibility,41
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The duty of loyalty has been called "the essence of the fiduciary
relationship"6 and even has been considered an expression synonymous with
fiduciary. 7 The fiduciary relationship relies on the fiduciary's loyalty to the
beneficiary, and, as the beneficiary is assumed to be on the losing end of any
conflict with the fiduciary's personal interests, loyalty can be preserved only if
the relationship is stripped of the possibility of such conflicts. The duty of
loyalty is, therefore, not the duty to resist temptation but to eliminate temptation,
as the former is assumed to be impossible. The trustee is at the pinnacle of
fiduciary duty and is held to the highest standards. As compared to other
fiduciaries, the trustee holds the highest level of control over the other's
property.' It, therefore, follows that the trustee's duty of loyalty will be
paramount and unforgiving, at least one hundred percent. Of course, the trustee
has a harderjob than Mr. Goldwyn's employees because a trustee's duty of care
is certainly higher than fifty percent.' Generally, if a trustee breaches her duty
of loyalty by self-dealing,'I there is no further inquiry and the transaction is
voidable by the beneficiaries regardless of the fairness ofthe transaction. Ifthe
breach is a less direct conflict, a trustee may be able to uphold the transaction by
proving fairness.' The Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") follows the approach of
predecessor uniform statutes and some state codifications in leaving the core of
the common law duty of loyalty intact, with only minor relaxations of the duty
in specific instances where convenience far outweighs risk. However, the UTC
has rearranged somewhat the parameters for determining when a transaction's

WASH. L. REv. 801, 803 (1966) ("Given human frailty, we cannot expect the fiduciary
to put his personal advantage in second place. That 'no man can serve two masters' is
a commonplace, and the difficulty is compounded where one of the masters is his own

self-interest.").
6. J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIEs 48 (1981).
7. D.W.M. WATERS, LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 33 (1974).
8. As stated by Professor Scott:
Some fiduciary relationships are undoubtedly more intense than others. The
greater the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary, the greater
the scope of his fiduciary duty. Thus, a trustee is under a stricter duty of
loyalty than is an agent upon whom limited authority is conferred or a
corporate director who can act only as a member of the board of directors or
a promoter acting for investors in a new corporation.
Austin W. Scott, The FiduciaryPrinciple,37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (stating trustee's duty of
care).

10. Self-dealing is defined as "where [a] person in [a] fiduciary or confidential
relationship uses property of another for his own personal benefit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1359 (6th ed. 1990).
11. BOGERT & BOGERT, supranote 5, § 543, at 247-48.
12. See In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 295-96 (N.Y. 1977).
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fairness will be available to the trustee as a defense and, in doing so, has added
functional tests and clarity. This Article summarizes the common law origins of
the duty of loyalty and various past attempts at codifying the duty. It then
analyzes the UTC's formulation of the duty and discusses how it provides
guidance to both the acting trustee and to the court in determining whether a
breach has occurred.
II. COMMON LAW HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF TijE DUTY OF LOYALTY
The duty of loyalty requires the trustee to "administer the trust solely in the
interests of the beneficiaries."' 3 In general, this duty prolibits the trustee from
transacting in her individual capacity with the trust and from entering into
transactions where the trustee is not directly dealing -with the trust but,
nevertheless, has a conflict ofinterest.14 The duty ofloyalty is joined by the duty
of prudent administration in forming the law of fiduciary duty.'5
The law of fiduciary duty was a relatively modem development in the
history of the trust. Originally, a trustee's powers were extremely restricted in
that the trustee's original role was more of a passive titleholder rather than an
active asset manager.' 6 For example, in 1719, the British Parliament authorized
trustees to invest in the South Sea Company. When the South Sea Company
stock sank in value the following year, laws were passed requiring trustees to
invest only in securities on a list approved by the legislature.' 7 This technique
carried over to American trust law, but, in part because of the newness of the
American economy and in part due to the modernizing of the economy, the list
approach gave way to the prudent man standard.'" At the same time, the purpose
of trusts was evolving from a way to hold and convey real property to
management of financial assets.' 9 As the role of the trustee shifted from
stakeholder to manager, it was necessary to grant the trustee broad discretion.
The trend from the beginning ofthis shift in the nineteenth century to the present
day has been to broaden the trustee's powers further and further, to provide the

13. UNIF.TRUSTCODE § 802(a) (2000) [hereinafterUTC]; REsTATEMENT(SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
14. 2A AUsTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS §§ 170-170.25, at 311-437 (4th ed. 1987).
15. John Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625,655 (1995).

16. Langbein, supra note 15, at 633.
17. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner,Market Funds and Trust Investment
Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3-4.
18. J. Alan Nelson, Comment, The Prudent Person Rule: A Shield for the
ProfessionalTrustee, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 933, 940-41 (1993).
19. Langbein, supra note 15, at 637.
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trustee with the full capacity to take advantage of all market opportunities to
maximize the trust's value. As the trustee's powers expanded, however, the
beneficiaries' interests were increasingly at risk from abuse of that discretion.
As the control of limited powers retreated, leaving unprotected ground, the
fiduciary principle filled that space with a different type of check on trustee
misbehavior.20
Together, the duty of loyalty and the duty of prudent administration
imposed on the trustee, and the liabilities foi breach of these duties, give the
trustee the incentive not to abuse his or her discretion and give beneficiaries a
remedy in the event of such abuse. While this scheme does not protect the
beneficiary as much as the original scheme of limited trustee powers, the role of
the modem trust as management device would not be possible without trustee
discretion.
While breaches of the duty of prudent administration are judged on the
basis of reasonableness of the trustee's conduct,21 a breach of the duty ofloyalty
is generally voidable at the option of the beneficiary, regardless of whether the
transaction was otherwise fair to the trust. 2 This "no further inquiry" rule is
applicable in all self-dealing transactions, i.e., where the trustee individually is
a party to the transaction with the trust, and in any transaction where the trustee's
personal interests are "substantially" affected.23 If the trustee's conflict is not
substantial, then the trustee may avoid liability by establishing the fairness ofthe
transaction. 24
The duty of loyalty prohibits a broad range of activity by the trustee. The
prohibited transactions include the trustee's purchase or lease of trust property
for her own account,' sale of trust property to a third person with an
understanding that the third person then will sell to the trustee,26 sale of trust
property to a corporation in which the trustee is a substantial owner or serves in

20. Langbein, supranote 15, at 637.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).

22. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 571 (5th Cir. 1966). In Fulton
NationalBank, the court stated:

[T]he beneficiary need only show that the fiduciary allowed himself to be
placed in a position where his personal interest might conflict with the interest
of the beneficiary. It is unnecessary to show that the fiduciary succumbed to
this temptation, that he acted in bad faith, that he gained an advantage, fair or
unfair, that the beneficiary was harmed. Indeed, the law presumes that the
fiduciary acted disloyally, and inquiry into such matters is foreclosed.
Id. (emphasis added).
23. SCoTr & FRATCHER, supra note
24. SCOTT &FRATCHER, supra note
25. SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note
26. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note

14, § 170.10, at 346.

14, § 170.24, at 432-33.
14, § 170.1.

14, § 170.6.
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a management capacity,27 sale of the trustee's individually owned property to the
trst,r purchase by a corporate trustee of its own stock as an investment for the
trust," and appropriation of a trust opportunity.3 ° These transactions, as well as
other similar conflicts, are all considered self-dealingand are subject to the no
further inquiry rule.
For example, in Pittsv. Blackwell,3 Mr. Blackwell, who happened to be an
undertaker, was appointed as co-conservator for an elderly woman. The ward
held a prepaid burial insurance policy with another funeral home, and Mr.
Blackwell and his co-conservator had it transferred to Mr. Blackwell's
establishment.33 When the ward died, the co-conservator made all of the
decisions regarding the funeral, which turned out to be the most expensive
funeral Mr. Blackwell ever had provided and exceeded the proceeds ofthe burial
policy by more than $18 ,000 .4 In reversing the lower court's approval of the
conservatorship accounting, the court noted that a conservator's duties were
similar to, and even more stringently applied than, the duties of trustee, and it
quoted a prior court's statement that "[n]othing in the law of fiduciary trusts is
better settled than that the trustee shall not be allowed to advantage himself in
dealings with the trust estate. He shall not be allowed to serve himselfunder the
pretense of serving his cestui que trust."35 In spite of the indisputable assertion
that the funeral services were necessary, the court remanded for a determination
of reasonable funeral expenses in light of the deceased ward's estate, with
instructions that such amount only could be approved to the extent of actual
expenses incurred by Mr. Blackwell, without including any profit to Mr.
Blackwell.36

27. SCOTT& FRATCHER, supranote 14, § 170.10.

28. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote 14, § 170.12.
29. ScoTT &FRATCHER, supranote 14, § 170.15.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. k (1959).
31. No. M200-01733-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 938, at *1(Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 28, 2001).
32. Id. at *2.
33. Id. at *2-3.
34. Id. at *5.
35. Id. at* 12-13.
36. Id. at *16. While it appears that, in this case, Mr. Blackwell's establishment
did not directly control funds under the prepaid funeral policy while the ward was alive,
see id. at *3 n. 1,if the funeral home is the direct seller of the prepaid plan and holds title
to the funds while the insured is alive, the funeral home may be treated as a trustee under
applicable state law. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5-401 to -408 (Michie 1997); Judith
A. Frank,PreneedFuneralPlans: The CaseforUniformity, 4ELDERL.J. 1,7-8(1996).
Thus, a person in Mr. Blackwell's situation could well be serving in multiple fiduciary
roles.
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The no further inquiry rule can have interesting consequences. In Grynberg
v. Watt,37 co-trustees of a trust entered a Bureau of Land Management lottery for
the lease of a parcel of land in their capacity as co-trustees of the trust.38 The cotrustees also filed drawing entry cards in their individual capacity.39 The trust
won the drawing, but the Bureau of Land Management rejected the offers from
the trust and the trustees because they violated the prohibition against multiple
filings.'"The trustees appealed, and the court upheld the rejection ofthe offers. 4'
It found that, if either of the trustees had held the winning entry, that trustee
would have had to give the entry to the trust because entering the drawing was
in substantial competition with the trust and the no further inquiry would apply,
requiring the winning trustee to give the opportunity to the trust.42 The court
rejected the trustees' argument that the competition had to be "substantial" to
trigger the no further inquiry rule. It held instead that, here, the multiple entries
placed the trustees in a position where conflicts of interest may arise, particularly
if the trust received a priority higher than the individual trustee, because the
trustee's secondary position might affect the trustee's decision whether to take
the lease for the trust.43 Thus, the individual filings by the trustees were
equivalent to two additional filings by the trust, thereby disqualifying all of
them.4
The duty of loyalty also can be breached where the trustee favors not itself
but another trust for which it is serving as trustee. 45 For example, in Wiggins v.
PNC Bank Kentucky, Inc.,' the bank was trustee of two trusts for the lifetime
benefit of an elderly woman. The trusts had different grantors and different
remaindermen 7 Each ofthe trusts allowed the trustee to invade principal for the
benefit of the lifetime beneficiary.48 Upon the death of the lifetime beneficiary,
the remaindermen of one ofthe trusts sued the trustee for invading principal for
her care in a nursing home, without court approval, and the court held that the

37. 717 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,466 U.S. 958 (1984).
38. Id. at 1317.
39. Id. In addition, the trustees put in entries for two related trusts for which they

served as trustees.
40. Id.; see 43 C.F.R. § 3112.5-2 (1987).
41. Grynberg, 717 F.2d at 1317.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1319-20.
Id.
Id. at 1317-18.
Sco'rr &FRATCHER, supranote 14, § 170.16.
988 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 499.
Id. at 499-500.
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trustee breached its duty to act with "utmost fidelity" toward the remaindermen
49

of both trusts.

The major difficulty with the duty of loyalty is defining its boundaries.
Clearly, the trustee is prohibited from dealing directly with the trust. In
situations where the trustee stands to benefit personally from a transaction
between the trust and a third party, however, the existence of a breach depends
on the degree and significance of that personal benefit. The comments to the
Restatement extend the duty as follows: "The trustee violates his duty to the
beneficiary not only where he purchases trust property for himself individually,
but also where he has a personal interest in the purchase of such a substantial
nature that it might affect his judgment in making the sale."5 0 Professor Bogert
acknowledged that it is disloyal for a trustee to enter into a transaction for the
trust "in order to obtain an incidental personal benefif"' because the incidental
benefit may cloud his judgment about the trust's beneficial interest in the
transaction.5 2 Bogert went on to note, however, that several courts have not
found a violation of a duty where the trustee will obtain only an indirect
benefit.5 3 As stated by Scott, "the trustee does not necessarily incur liability
merely because he has an individual interest in the transaction."' 4 The issue
whether the transaction is prohibited, therefore, will be determined ona case-bycase basis hinging on the significance of the benefit and the likelihood that the
trustee's judgment could be affected.
The case ofFultonNationalBankv.Tate"s illustrates a court grappling with
a situation that is not quite direct self-dealing but is clearly a conflict In Fulton,
before Steve Tate became a fiduciary, he was attempting to persuade the Georgia
Marble Company ("Marble") to exchange a piece of property owned by the
company with a parcel he owned. 6 Marble refused, but Mr. Tate persisted in
pursuing the exchange. Subsequently, he became executor of an estate that
leased land to Marble, which had a significant capital investment in the leased
property and, thus, a strong need to obtain renewals ofthe leases.5 Mr. Tate was
careful to keep his roles with Marble separate, "conscious that he had to change
coats rather than wear Jacob's many colored coat."5 9 Mr. Tate's relationship

49. Id. at 500-01.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt.

55. 363 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1966).
56.
57.
58.
59.

c (1959).

BOGERT & BOGERT, supranote 5, § 543(Q), at 383.
BOGERT & BOGERT, supranote 5, § 543(Q), at 383.
BOGERT& BOGERT, supranote 5, § 543(Q), at 383-90.
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supranote 14, § 170.24.
Id. at 565, 567.
Id. at 567-68.
Id. at 565, 568.
Id. at 568.

MISSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 67

with Marble was apparently unfriendly, resulting in "litigation, harsh words, and
even shootings."" Eventually, Mr. Tate and Marble worked out a deal for the
exchange, but Marble refused to close on the deal until the leases with the estate
were renewed. 6' The property exchange and the lease renewal were signed the
same day.62 The beneficiaries sued to impose a constructive trust on the land Mr.
Tate received in the sale, and the issue on appeal was which party had the burden
of proving whether Mr. Tate had made a profit in the exchange.63 If Mr. Tate
had made no personal profit from the exchange, he would have no liability.6
The court noted that "general rules on the fiduciary's duty of undivided loyalty
are necessarily general and offer limited help in resolving a concrete problem in
this area." 6 The court further noted that there are conflicting policy
considerations: the need to hold the beneficiary's interest as paramount ("the
first commandment of fiduciary relations") versus the danger that the job of
trustee would be so treacherons that responsible persons would refuse to do it."
Therefore, "[m]erely vague orremote possible selfish advantages to a trustee are
not sufficient to prove such an adverse interest as to bring his conduct into
question."'67 The court went on to note that the no inquiry rule is punitive rather
than compensatory because it is intended to discourage the trustee from putting
himself in a conflict position.6" The underlying assumption is that human nature
will cause the trustee to favor himself over the trust in any conflict of interest. 69
"Though equity protects the beneficiary with a gentle wand, it polices the
fiduciary with a big stick."70 In applying these principles, the court held that the
burden was on Mr. Tate to prove that he received no profit, and, if he failed, he
would be required to remit to the beneficiaries any profit made by him on the
exchange. 7' It was irrelevant whether the lease terms were unfavorably affected
by Mr. Tate's individual transaction.72 Mr. Tate tried to argue that his exchange
was a separate transaction unconnected to the lease and, therefore, not a breach
of his duty as described by the Restatement comments.7 3 However, the court
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 569.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 570.

67.
1952)).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at 570 (citing Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 196 F.2d 668, 675 (2d Cir.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 570-71.
Id. at 570.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §

203 cmt. e (1959).
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held that, because the two transactions were inextricably linked, it was "tit for
tat down to the wire."' 4
There are easier cases in which a third party is involved but a breach of the
duty of loyalty, nevertheless, can be found, such as where the third party is a
straw man or where the third party is an entity substantially owned by the
trustee. 5 As the connection becomes less than a complete alter ego, the cases
look to whether the common interest is sufficient to affect the trustee's
76
judgment.
The common law was particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the
duty. 7 As described by a mid-century commentator:
Somehow ...a trustee will assume a halo complex and
insist that an exception be made for him; but courts wisely
realize that the rule must be adamant and that to allow
exceptions to chip it away piecemeal would destroy it just
as effectively as if its entirety were shattered with one
78
sledgehammer blow.
If the conflict is not judged to be self-dealing or substantial enough to
trigger the no further inquiry rule, then the trustee has the opportunity to avoid
liability by proving that the transaction was otherwise fair to the trust. It then
becomes a matter ofmismanagement because, even in the absence of a conflict,
a trustee could be liable for a bad deal. However, liability of the trustee for a
bad business deal can be increased where the transaction involved a conflict of
interest. In reEstateofRothko7 9 is a classic example of conflicts of interest that
affected the fiduciaries' liability for unreasonable business transactions.
In Rothko, the three executors ofthe estate of the artist Mark Rothko were:
Bernard J. Reis, who was director, secretary, and treasurer of Marlborough
Gallery, Inc.; Theodoros Stamos, a friend and fellow artist (although much less
successful than Rothko) who was represented by Marlborough; and Morton

74. Fulton Nat ' Bank, 363 F.2d at 575.
75. SCOIT & FRATCHER,supranote 14, §§ 170.6, 170.10.
76. BOGERT & BOGERT, supranote 5, § 543(A), at 281-82; ScoiT & FRATCHER,
supra note 14, § 170.6.

77. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.)
("Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular

exceptions.").
78. Judge Earl R. Hoover, Basic Principles UnderlyingDuty of Loyalty, 5 CLEv.REv. 7, 14(1956).

MARSHALLL.

79. 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
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Levine, a friend not directly involved with the art world.8" Within three months
of Rothko's suicide, the three executors had arranged for the sale of 798
paintings.8 One hundred of the paintings were sold directly to Marlborough
A.G., a Lichtenstein corporation affiliated with the Marlborough Gallery.82 The
sales terms were very favorable to Marlborough; $200,000 was paid at sale, and
a balance of $1.6 million was to be paid in twelve annual installments, with no
interest.3 The remaining paintings were to be consigned to Marlborough
Gallery and sold, no more than thirty-five a year, with Marlborough receiving
a commission of forty to fifty percent for each sale.'
Rothko's will had left the bulk of his estate to the Mark Rothko Foundation,
which was controlled by the three executors.85 However, Rothko's children
successfully made a claim in the estate under New York's mortmain statute,
which was then in effect,86 and filed claims against the executors for breach of
fiduciary duty in disposing of the paintings. Reis and Stamos argued that their
connections with Marlborough were incidental and that, as there was no direct
self-dealing, the no further inquiry rule was inapplicable and the transactions
would have to be proven unfair to be voidable. 8 The court replied that the
' The
argument that there were no significant conflicts was "sheer fantasy."89
court quoted Bogert: "'While he [,a trustee,] is administering the trust he must
refrain from placing himself in a position where his personal interest or that of
a third person does or may conflict with the interest of the beneficiaries"' and
went on to state that, because of their close ties with the purchaser, "one must
strain the law rather than follow it to reach the result suggested on behalf of Reis
and Stamos."' Nevertheless, the holding did not turn on an application of the
no further inquiry rule because there were significant findings that the

80. Id.
at 293-95.
81. Id.
at 293.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.at 294.
86. Id.A mortmain statute, intended to protect testators from undue influence by

clergy while on their deathbeds, typically voids a gift to charity if the gift exceeds a
certain portion ofthe estate, the will is executed within a short time before the decedent's
death, and there are qualifying surviving family members (such as spouses or children).
MARK REUTLINGER, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS

215-16 (2d ed. 1998).
87. Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 293.
88. Id.at 295.
89. Id. at 296.
90. Id. (quoting GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 343 (5th ed. 1973)).

91. Id.
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transactions were, in fact, unfair.9 The damages assessed against Reis and
Stamos were measured differently than the damages assessed against Levine
because he did not have conflicts of interest and merely violated the duty of
care.93 Levine was liable for the difference between the paintings' true value at
the time ofthe transactions and the price obtained, but Reis and Stamos, because
of the conflicts, were assessed "appreciation damages," ie., the difference
between the value of the paintings at time of trial and the price obtained. 94 The
court noted that appreciation damages were appropriate to impose in cases in
which a fiduciary has sold an asset that he was required to retain, because only
appreciation damages would make the beneficiaries whole. 9 The court extended
that reasoning to impose appreciation damages where there has been wrongdoing
96
by the fiduciaries as a matter of policy.
The duty of loyalty may be relaxed by the settlor of the trust with specific
language in the trust instrument, but such clauses are generally strictly
construed. Even if the trust allows the trustee to engage in self-dealing, the
trustee must exercise that power with good faith toward the trust.98
The settlor implicitly may authorize conflicts of interest by appointing as
trustee a person who has another interest in the trust or the trust property. For
example, the trustee also may be a beneficiary of the trust, or a trust may be
funded in part with stock in the corporate trustee. Whether a court will find such
implied authorization of a conflict of interest is uncertain, however. There are
examples of holdings of implied authorizations, cited by Professor Bogert in his
treatise. 9 Shearv. Gabovitch °° is a recent example of this. The beneficiary of

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 296-97.
Id. at 297-99.
Id. at 297; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 208(b) (1959).
Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 297.

97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt. a (1959); BOGERT &

BOGERT, supranote 5, § 543(U). Butsee TEX. PROB. CODEANN. § 113.059(b) (Vernon
1980); UNIF. TRUST ACT § 17 (1937) (both incorporating the minority position
disallowing exoneration clauses for breach of duty of loyalty).
98. Charles B. Baron, Self-Dealing Trustees and the Exoneration Clause: Can
TrusteesEver ProfitfromTransactionsInvolving Trust Property?,72 ST. JOHN'SL.REV.

43,65 (1998).
99. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 543(U), at 424-25.
In some cases where the settlor knew when his trust was drawn that the
trustee whom he proposed to name was then in a position which, after
acceptance of the trust, would expose him to a conflict between personal and
representative interests, it has been held that there was an implied exemption
from the duty of loyalty in so far as that transaction was concerned.
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, at 424-25; see also Louis C. Haggerty, Conflicting
Interests of Estate Fiduciariesin New York and the "No Further Inquiry" Rule, 18
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a trust was challenging the sale of hospital trust shares back to the corporation
on several grounds, one of which was that one of the trustees served as an
accountant for the hospital, as well as for several shareholders ofthe hospital and
an affiliated corporation."0 ' However, the court rejected this argument, noting
that he was serving as accountant for the various parties at the time he was
appointed trustee. The court cited the Restatement comment that "[t]he court
will not ordinarily remove a trustee named by the settlor upon a ground existing
at the time of his appointment and known to the settlor and in spite ofwhich the
settlor appointed him" and noted that, in an extremely antagonistic situation, the
trustee and his co-trustee were:
Like an attorney who resists the more extreme demands of
his clients and thereby serves his client better, required
neither by their role as trustees nor by the law to be
unthinking sycophants for [the beneficiaries]. Whatever
else may be said of the roles [the accountant trustee] filled
for the hospital and the trusts, he was not, up to and
including the sale of the hospital shares, disloyal to the
trusts or to the [beneficiaries].
On the other hand, the Rothko case is a severe example of a court ignoring
the conflicts imbedded in the trustee appointment that would have been known
to the settlor. Mark Rothko signed a long-term consignment contract with
Marlborough during his life and sold paintings to the gallery for prices similar
to those obtained by the executors. 10 3 More significantly, Rothko knew of the
ties of the two executors to the gallery and appointed them as directors of the
Foundation that was the residuary beneficiary." ° It was only the New York
mortmain statute that created the rights of his children to challenge the
executors' actions. The court, nevertheless, ignored the implied authorization
and acceptance of these conflicts on the part of the testator.
In light of all of this ambiguity, the utility of the duty of loyalty, its no
further inquiry rule, and the need to maintain it as unbending and without

FoRDHAML.REV. 1,3 (1949) ("In some cases, the testator or settlor has been responsible
for placing the fiduciary in a position of conflicting interests, and the courts have been
obliged in the interests ofjustice to inquire into the facts and then to hold that there had
been an implied waiver of the rule against self-dealing.").
100. 685 N.E.2d 1168 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
101. Id. at 1171-72.
102. Id. at 1190-91.
103. Richard V. Wellman, Punitive SurchargesAgainst DisloyalFiduciaries-Is
Rothko Right?, 77 MICH. L. REv. 95, 113 (1978).

104. Id.
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exception, can be open to question. The no further inquiry rule is not without its
critics. One commentator has complained that:
[i]t may and often does miss its real target, the faithless fiduciary, and
hit the one who has acted in the best of faith. It may operate not to
protect beneficiaries from wrongdoers but to give them undue and
undeserved advantages over fiduciaries who thought they were
obeying the rules."0 5
The same commentator concluded that the no further inquiry rule:
sounds so plausible; it appears to be so noble of purpose; it rings with
such honesty. It has everything except the ability to resist analysis.
It is pleasing as rhetoric, but it is bad law, as is any law, statutory or
judge-made, which establishes a policy rather than abstract justice as
the standard of individual guilt."0 6
Professor Langbein, in arguing for a contractarian approach to enforcing trusts,
similarly pointed out that "[t]he prophylactic duty of loyalty presses too harshly
on trustees and comparable fiduciaries in settings such as Rothko."' 7 Professor
Langbein's solution would be to use a contracts analysis to look at "the real
nature of the trust deal"'0" and apply the standard of conduct that the parties
intended, even if not spelled out in the trust instrument.
One cannot ignore, however, the role that the no further inquiry rule plays
in the fiduciary relationship and the impossibility of filling that role in another
manner. The early commentators pointed out that strict prohibition, rather than
punishment only of fiduciaries who abuse their power in conflict situations, is
necessary because mere temptation is too dangerous to the beneficiaries'
interests."° Professors Cooter and Freedman subjected what they termed
fiduciary misappropriation to an economic analysis and concluded that the
economic characteristics of the fiduciary relationship require the strict rules."
The nature of the relationship makes it difficult for the beneficiary to detect any
wrongdoing, and, if the usual tort rules, putting the burden on the victim to
discover and prove the wrong, applied in this context, the low risk of getting

105. Haggerty, supra note 99, at 2.
106. Haggerty, supra note 99, at 28.

107. Langbein, supranote 15, at 667.
108. Langbein, supranote 15, at 667.
109. BOGERT & BOGERT, supranote 5, § 543, at 227.
110. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The FiduciaryRelationship: Its
Economic CharacterandLegal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991).
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caught would encourage fiduciaries to cheat."' The set of rules known as the
duty of loyalty, therefore, is needed to deter wrongdoing. These rules do so by
either conclusively presuming wrongdoing, in the case of self-dealing or
substantial conflicts of interest, or shifting the burden of proof to the fiduciary
(as in the corporate fiduciary context)." 2
In sum, the duty of loyalty is a necessary corollary to broad trustee
discretion. To some extent, ambiguity in its reach is desirable because the
trustee must be conservative in order to avoid liability, whereas bright-line tests
provide manipulative trustees a blueprint of how far they can go without risking
liability. Nevertheless, ambiguity also results in uneven and inconsistent
enforcement of the duty, can catch unwitting, well-meaning trustees, and
unnecessarily can tie the hands of those trustees whose conflicts are created by
the trust settlor.
III. OTHER CODIFICATIONS OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
Many states have attempted through statute to clarify the reach or proper
resolution 'of the duty of loyalty. Indiana's statute uses broad language,
providing that: "[i]f the duty ofthe trustee in the exercise ofany power conflicts
with his individual interest or his interest as trustee of another trust, the power
may be exercised only with court authorization.""' 3 The statute attributes the
interests of a trustee's affiliate to 4the trustee in determining whether there is a
conflict with the trust's interest."
There is additional guidance, however, in the Indiana statutory scheme. A
later statute specifically prohibits certain transactions, such as borrowing from
the trust, purchasing trust property, selling the trustee's own property to the trust,
or holding stock ofitself in the trust. "' The statutory restrictions are inapplicable
if the transactions are specifically authorized by the trust agreement." 6 The
statute also specifically allows a corporate trustee to invest in its own
obligations, such as savings accounts or certificates of deposit, as long as those
' Furthermore, the statute allows the trustee to deal with
obligations are insured. 17
itself as trustee of another trust as long as the terms of the transaction are fair and
reasonable, and there is full disclosure to the beneficiaries." 8 Finally, the statute
requires that all dealings between the trustee individually and the beneficiary,

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1051-52.
Id. at 1054.
IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-5(a) (Lexis 2000).
IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-5(b) (Lexis 2000).
IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-7(a) (Lexis 2000).
IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-7(a) (Lexis 2000).
IND. CODE ANN. § 304-3-7(b)-(c) (Lexis 2000).
IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-7(e) (Lexis 2000).
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even if permitted by the trust agreement, must be fair and must fully disclose to
the beneficiary of all material facts known to the trustee." 9 The Indiana statute,
therefore, gives significant guidance regarding some specified activities, and by
using the term "conflicts of interest," rather than self-dealing, implies that the
duty of loyalty prohibits all conflicts, direct and indirect.
Michigan's statute does not address the general duty of loyalty, but it
prohibits transactions between the trustee individually and the trust, bars the
trustee from purchasing for the trust an interest in an affiliate of the trustee
(except for bonds and minority stock holdings, which are acceptable), and
forbids the trustee from personally deriving a profit from transactions involving
trust property. 2 0 These prohibitions are subject to modification in the trust
agreement, however.12 ' The statute, therefore, presents a relatively narrow
definition of the duty of loyalty, includes only direct conflicts, and does not
appear to prohibit transactions where the trustee's personal interest is indirect,
unless the conflict could be characterized as deriving a profit from transactions
involving trust property. The statute specifically allows the trustee to deposit
money in a bank or trust company in which the trustee is an officer, director, or
stockholder."
California codifies the Restatement definition ofthe duty of loyalty, which
states that "the trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of
the beneficiaries."'" The Law Revision Commission comments to this Section
of the Restatement state that "[t]his article does not attempt to state all aspects
of the trustee's duty of loyalty, nor does this article seek to cover all duties that
may exist."' 4 Nevertheless, California's statute expands on what may constitute
violations of the duty of loyalty and offers some safe harbors. It authorizes
transactions between trusts where one trustee serves both, as long as the
transaction is fair and full disclosure has been made."~ The trustee has a duty
not to use or deal with trust property for the trustee's own profit or for any other
purpose unconnected with the trust, nor to take part in any transaction in which
the trustee has an interest adverse to the beneficiary. 2 6 This broad prohibition
would seem to apply to all conflicts, no matter how indirect.
California also has a statutory provision prohibiting the trustee from

119. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-7(d) (Lexis 2000).
120. MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 700.1214 (West 2000).
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.1214 (West 2000).
122. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.1214 (West 2000).
123. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16002(a) (West 1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 170 (1959).

124. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16002 cmt. (West Supp. 1995).

125. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16002(b) (West 1991). This provision is modeled after
the Indiana statute. See IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-7(d) (Lexis 2000).
126. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16004(a) (West 1991).
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enforcing any claim against the trust property that the trustee purchased after or
in contemplation of appointment as trustee, but the court may allow the trustee
to be reimbursed from trust property for'the amount that the trustee paid in good
faith for the claim. 7 There is also a statutory presumption of fiduciary violation
whenever the trustee enters into a transaction with a beneficiary that occurs
during the existence of the trust or while the trustee's influence with the
beneficiary remains and by which the trustee obtains an advantage from the
beneficiary." Finally, there is a statutory provision that authorizes a financial
of a trustee to use its own
institution serving as trustee or that is an affiiliate
29
business.
of
course
services for in the ordinary
A North Dakota statute defines the duty of loyalty in the negative:
A trustee shall not use or deal with the trust property for the trustee's
own profit or for any other purpose not connected with the trust. If the
trustee does so, the trustee, at the option of the beneficiary, may be
required to account for all profits made thereby, or to pay the value of
the use of the trust property, and, if the trustee has disposed thereof, to
replace it with its fruits or to account for its proceeds with interest. 3 '
However, if after full disclosure, the trust beneficiaries either consent to or the
court approves of the transaction if the beneficiaries lack capacity to consent, a
With respect to transactions
conflict of interest transaction is authorized.'
between a trustee individually and a beneficiary, the trustee is prohibited from
using the influence that the trustee's position gives the trustee to obtain any
advantage from the trust's beneficiary. 32 There is a statutory presumption that
any transaction between the trustee and the beneficiary that is advantageous to
the trustee is for inadequate consideration and a result of undue influence. 33 The
trustee is also prohibited from becoming trustee134of another trust whose interests
are adverse to the beneficiary of the first trust.
In summary, the state statutes generally offer broad statements of the
common law of fiduciary duty, and provide some safe harbors allowing bank
trustees to use their own services and allowing fair transactions that are not direct
self-dealing, such as transactions with beneficiaries. In some cases, the statutes
make broad statements prohibiting all transactions involving conflicts, which

127. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16004(b) (West 1991).
128. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16004(c) (West 1991).
129. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16015 (West 1991).
130. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-10 (1995).
131. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-11 (Supp. 2001).
132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-12 (1995).
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-15 (1995).
134. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-13 (1995).
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potentially could muddy the waters more than the ambiguity existing under the
common law.
The uniform acts that predate the UTC generally took a similar approach.
The Uniform Trusts Act, adopted in 1937, was relatively limited in scope despite
its broad title. It did not address the duty of loyalty fully; rather, it contained
specific provisions affecting specific circumstances that implicate the duty. For
example, it prohibited a trustee from borrowing trust funds and from loaning
trust funds to its affiliates, directors, officers, employees, partners, or relatives. 3
Trustees were also forbidden from "directly or indirectly" buying or selling trust
property, or entering into any such transaction between the trust and the trustee's
affiliates, directors, officers, employees, partners, or relatives. 136 If the trustee
served as trustee ofmultiple trusts, he was prohibited from selling trust property
from one trust to another. 37 A corporate trustee was prohibited from purchasing
shares of its own stock or the stock of an affiliate. 31 The trustee could be
exempted from these prohibitions by the trust agreement, except that exoneration
for direct self-dealing was prohibited. 39 Likewise, beneficiaries could relieve
the trustee from these duties and restrictions, 40 except for borrowing trust
funds,' 4' purchasing trust property by the trustee individually or selling
individual property to the trust, 42 and the duties regarding the deposit of trust
funds with a bank trustee. 43 A corporate trustee was allowed to deposit funds
with itself, as long as the deposits were insured or the corporate trustee held a
separate fund as security for such deposits, and the deposits were accounted for
44
separately.
The Uniform Trustees Powers Act ("UTPA"), adopted in 1964, addressed
the duty of loyalty only to create certain exceptions. Section 5 of the Act
provided that, whenever a conflict between the trustee's individual interests and
the trust existed, the trustee must obtain court authorization to act, with certain
exceptions. 145 The Act explicitly extended the duty of loyalty to situations where

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

UNiF. TRUSTS ACT § 3, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000).
UNiF. TRUSTS AT § 5, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000).
UNIF. TRUSTS ACT § 6, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000).
UNiF. TRUSTS ACT § 7, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000).
UNIF. TRUSTS AT § 17, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000).
UNiF. TRUSTS ACT § 18, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000).
UNIF. TRUSTS ACT § 18, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000) (loaning to affiliates also

could not be excused).
142. UNIF. TRUSTS ACT § 18, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000) (sales to or from affiliates also
could not be excused).
143. UNiF. TRUSTS ACT § 18, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000).
144. UNIF. TRUSTS ACT § 4, 7C U.L.A. 446 (2000).

145. UNIF. TRUSTEES' PoWERs ACT § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 426 (2000).
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an affiliated or subsidiary entity to the trustee would profit.'" The exceptions
to the requirement of court authorizations were: retention of assets received
from the trustor in which the trustee was personally interested;'47 acquisition of
an undivided interest in an asset in which the trustee held an undivided interest
for another trust;' 48 deposit of trust funds in a bank operated by the trustee; 49
advancement of money for trust expenses, which advancements would be
covered by a lien in favor of the trustee against trust assets; 50 and employment
of professionals affiliated with the trustee to assist in trust administration.''
The UTPA met with some criticism for creating exceptions to the duty of
loyalty. One commentator expressed concern about allowing the trustee to retain
assets in which the trustee had an interest (such as stock in the trustee), allowing
a bank trustee to deposit trust funds with itself, and allowing the trustee to
delegate duties to professionals who were affiliated with the trustee.'5 2 The
commentator thought that these rather routine conflicts still presented potential
conflicts for the trustee that were too great to outweigh the convenience of trust
administration.' 53 Another contemporary commentator objected that the
exceptions to the duty of loyalty in the Act, taken as a group, were precisely the
erosion of the duty of loyalty that courts and commentators warned against.'5 4
In addition, taking the exceptions individually, the commentator argued that each
presented sufficient risk to the beneficiaries to be ill-advised.'55 The
commentator had a broader concern about any weakening of the duty of loyalty
because, in his view, the duty of loyalty needed strengthening in a climate where
trust administration was becoming a source of profits for institutional trustees.'5 6
The introductory comments to the UTC note that the UTPA "is outdated
and is entirely superseded by the Uniform Trust Code, principally at Sections
815,816, and 1012. States enacting the Uniform Trust Code should repeal their
existing trustee powers legislation."' 7 Similarly, the introductory comments
state that the Uniform Trusts Act addressed only limited issues, including the

146. UNIF. TRUSTEES' PowERS AcT § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 426 (2000).
147. UNIF. TRUSTEES' PowERs ACT § 3(c)(1), 7A U.L.A. 426 (2000).
148. UNiF. TRusTEEs' PowERs AcT § 3(c)(4), 7A U.L.A. 426 (2000).
149. UNIF. TRUSTEES' PoWERS ACT § 3(c)(6), 7A U.L.A. 426 (2000).
150. UNiF. TRUSTEES' POWERS AT § 3(c)(18), 7A U.L.A. 426 (2000).
151. UNIF. TRUSTEES' PowERS AT § 3(c)(24), 7A U.L.A. 426 (2000).
152. Paul G. Haskell, The Uniform Trustees'PowersAct, 32 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 168, 173-77 (1967).
153. Id.
154. Robert W. Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and the Basic
Principlesof FiduciaryResponsibility, 41 WASH. L. REV. 801, 812-13 (1966).
155. Id. at 813-23.
156. Id. at 824-27.
157. UTC introductory cmt.
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duty of loyalty, and that "States enacting the Uniform Trust Code should repeal
this earlier namesake."'' 8
The Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") also contains provisions addressing the
duty of loyalty. Section 3-713 provides that:
[a]ny sale or encumbrance to the personal representative, his spouse,
agent or attorney, or any corporation or trust in which he has a
substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction which is affected by
a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the personal
representative, is voidable by any person interested in the estate except
59
one who has consented after fair disclosure.
There are three exceptions to voidability: (1) ifthe beneficiary consented after
fair disclosure; (2) if the decedent expressly authorized the transaction; and (3)
if court approval for the transaction is obtained." This provision is consistent
with common law statements of the duty of loyalty. However, it includes as a
voidable transaction one "which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest"
and does not allow for a defense of reasonableness. The personal representative,
therefore, will be required to argue as to whether a given conflict was
substantial.
In addition, the UPC has a provision identical to Section 3(c)(24) of the
UTPA, which authorizes a fiduciary to hire professionals associated with the
fiduciary to advise or assist with the estate administration."" There is, therefore,
one exception to the prohibition ofconflicts ofinterest. The UPC provisions are
noteworthy because, with the adoption of the UTC, with its more detailed
delineation of the duty of loyalty and clarification of safe harbors, 6 2 trustees will
have more guidance and certainty than personal representatives. The
introductory comments to the UTC note that Article VII of the UPC, relating to
trust administration, is superseded by the UTC, and UPC sections on
representation principles for binding settlements and rules of construction
present some overlap with the UTC; however, there is no mention of the gap
between the two Codes' definitions of the duty of loyalty.

158. UTC introductory crnt.
159.
160.
161.
162.

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-713 (amended 1998).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-715(21) (amended 1998).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-715(25) (amended 1998).
See infra Part IV.

163. UTC introductory cmt.
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IV. THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE'S DEFINITION OF THE DUTY
The UTC provision begins with the Restatement'sbroad declaration of the
duty: "a trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the
beneficiaries.""IM The Section then goes on to give a sweeping definition ofwhat
type of transaction is voidable by the beneficiary: any transaction entered into
by the trustee involving the investment or management of trust property for the
trustee's personal account or "which is otherwise affected by a conflict between
the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests."' 65 This language is broader than
the UPC definition and the common law formulations'" because there is no
requirement that the conflict be significant or substantial. The Code includes
exceptions to voidability that are consistent with common law exceptions: if the
trust agreement authorized the transaction; if there was court approval of the
transaction; if the beneficiary consented, ratified, or released the trustee; if the
beneficiary did not comply with the statute of limitations; and if the transaction
predated the trustee's term as trustee or such time that the trustee expected to
become trustee.' 7 The comments indicate that the rules of representation for
beneficiaries who are under a disability or are unascertained apply when
determining whether consent, ratification, or release has been obtained.' 68
On its face, the Section, therefore, seems to expand the beneficiary's power
to void transactions. As the comments clarify, however, the effect of the Section
is actually to rein in the use of the no further inquiry rule. Transactions with
trust property entered into by a trustee for the trustee's own account are
"irrebuttably presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and
fiduciary interests,"'69 and, therefore, the fairness of the transaction is irrelevant
to voidability. There is, however, a looser standard applied to transactions with
affiliates of the trustee. A transaction is only presumed to be affected by the
conflict of interest if it is entered into with the trustee's spouse or other specified
family members, the trustee's agent or attorney, a corporation in which or other
person with whom the trustee "has an interest" that "might affect" the trustee's
judgment, or corporation in which or another person with whom a person who
holds significant ownership interest in the trustee has an interest that might affect
the trustee's judgment.'70 This language is taken from a regulation ofthe Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency that is applicable to fiduciary activities of

164. UTC § 802(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
165. UTC § 802(b).
166. See UNIF. PROBATECODE § 3-713 (amended 1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. c (1959).

167.
168.
169.
170.

UTC § 802(b).
UTC § 802 cmt.
UTC § 802 cmt.
UTC § 802(c).
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national banks.' That regulation provides that a national bank cannot transact
as fiduciary with persons or organizations "with whom there exists an interest
that might affect the exercise of the best judgment ofthe bank."'7 This language
omits the requirement that the conflict be "substantial" and, thus, shifts focus to
the broader question whether the fiduciary's interest was affected.
The presumption of fatal conflict can be rebutted, according to the
Comment, by a showing that "the transaction was not affected by a conflict
between personal and fiduciary interests."'7 Evidence that the conflict did not
affect the trustee's judgment includes evidence of the fairness of the
transaction.'74 The UTC, therefore, shifts the inquiry from whether the
transaction was fair, which can be a moving target, 75 to whether the trustee's
judgment might have been affected. The trustee's burden is, therefore, higher;
a transaction labeled fair supports the argument that the trustee's judgment was
not affected but does not answer the ultimate question. The structure ofthe UTC
sets that ultimate question as whether the judgment of the trustee might have
been compromised, which may be answered in the affirmative even if the
transaction was within a reasonable range. As noted in the comments, even if
the relationship between the trustee and the third person does not fit within the
categories that raise a presumption of unfairness, "a transaction may still be
voided by abeneficiary if the beneficiary proves that a conflict between personal
interests existed and that the transaction was affected by the
and fiduciary
' 1 76
conflict.
In addition to clarifying and refocusing the critical question to determine
what conflicts between the trust and the trustee deserve voidability, the UTC
identifies certain situations in which the parties are changed somewhat, but a
conflict is, nevertheless, possible. If the trustee takes a trust opportunity for
herself, such action constitutes a conflict between the personal and the fiduciary
interests of the trustee and is, therefore, irrebuttably voidable by an affected

171. 12 C.F.R. § 9.12 (2002).
172. UTC § 802 cmt. Thelanguage of this Section was draftedby Professor Scott,
who served on the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Technical Advisory
Committee in 1962 and 1963. Letter from Raymond, Acting Chief Counsel, Comptroller
of the Currency, to Honorable Maurice A. Hartnett, I, Supreme Court of Delaware,
Chair of UTC Drafting Committee (Sept. 16, 1998) (on file with Author).
173. UTC § 802 cmt.
174. UTC § 802 cmt.
175. As pointed out by one commentator, a fair price set by different appraisers can
vary, and the beneficiary in a fairness analysis can be stuck with accepting the lowest
"fair" price even though with a disinterested party the trust would have received a price
at the high end of"fair." Hoover, supranote 78, at 17.
176. UTC § 802 crnt.
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beneficiary.' 77 Transactions between a trustee and a beneficiary that are
unrelated to the trust property and that provide an advantage to the trustee are
voidable by the beneficiary if the transaction occurred while the trust existed or
while the trustee retained "significant influence" over the beneficiary, unless the
trustee can establish that the transaction was fair.'78 In this setting, the fairness
of the transaction is an absolute defense. In addition, the trustee must obtain an
advantage from the transaction that otherwise would not be available to a person
79
in an arm's length transaction.
The Code provides a number of safe harbors from a challenge of conflict
ofinterest for certain administrative conflicts. In order to receive this protection,
the transaction has to be fair to the beneficiaries. 8 ' The protected transactions
are: agreements between the trustee and a beneficiary relating to the trustee's
appointment or compensation; payment of reasonable compensation to the
trustee; transactions between trusts with a common trustee (or between a trust
and estate or guardianship with a common fiduciary) and transactions between
trusts or other fiduciary estates with a common beneficiary; deposit oftrust funds
with a trustee-operated bank; and a loan by the trustee to the trust for the
protection of the trust. 8' With respect to loans from the trustee, the trustee has
a lien for repayment under Section 709(b) of the Code. The comments note that
such advances are normally small in amount and done in an emergency or for
convenience. 182
There is also an exception for a trustee to invest in mutual funds for which
the trustee (or its affiliate) provides services, even if the mutual fund pays the
trustee a fee for services provided to the fund.'83 This exception carries several
conditions. First, the investment must be prudent under the prudent investor
rule. ' In order for the trustee to receive a portion of the fees paid to the mutual
fund company, as compensation for services rendered by the trustee to the
mutual fund company, the trustee must notify the beneficiaries annually about
the compensation arrangement. 8 The drafters of the UTC included this
provision in recognition that mutual funds can be advantageous investments for
trusts because of the ease of diversification and their ability to be distributed in

177. UTC § 802(e).
178. UTC § 802(d).
179. UTC § 802 cnt.

180. UTC § 802 (h).
181. UTC § 802 (h); see Miller v. Miller, 734 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. App. Ct.), cert.
denied,739 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2000) (allowing an executor interest on a loan made by
the executor to the estate for the purpose of paying estate taxes).
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UTC § 802(f).

2002]

THE DUTY OFLOYALTYAND THE UTC

kind from the trust, avoiding the triggering of capital gain. However, problems
can arise because institutional trustees often provide services to the mutual fimds
in which they invest trust funds, leaving the trustee open to disloyalty challenges
because the fees received by the trustee from the mutual fund company may
cloud its judgment regarding the prudence of the investment, and because the
combined fees received from the trust and the mutual fund company may be
considered excessive compensation. Subsection (f), which is based on state
statutes that allow trustees to receive compensation from funds in which trust
funds are invested, 8 ' provides that such investments are not automatically
presumed to be a conflict of interest by the trustee, but an actual conflict still
would be voidable. Also, the trustee must comply with the prudent investorrule.
These restrictions, together with the annual disclosure requirement, provide
sufficient protection to the beneficiaries' interests.
Another provision in Section 802 addresses the trustee's duty of care and
loyalty when dealing with corporate assets."8 7 The provision requires the trustee
to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries when voting stock or otherwise
exercising control over business enterprises in the trust, and, if the trust is the
sole owner of a corporation or other enterprise, the trustee is required to select
managers who will manage the business in the best interests ofthe beneficiaries.
The provision does not directly address the gap between the standard of a
trustee's duty of loyalty and the standard of a corporate director's duty of
loyalty. However, the comments state that "the trustee may not use the corporate
form to escape the fiduciary duties of trust law."'8 8 The example referred to in
the comments involves the duty of impartiality and requires a trustee to elect
directors who will issue dividends in a manner that would be fair to both the
income and remainder beneficiaries.'8 9
Trustees have attemptedto hidebehind the corporate form in other contexts.
For example, in Stegmeier v. Magness,'" fiduciaries were accused of selfdealing, and the court had to choose between the stringent standard applicable
to trustees or the more lenient standard applicable to corporate directors in
judging fiduciaries' actions. The decedent in that case owned real property in
a real estate development and eighty-three percent of a construction company,
and his will placed his property in two separate trusts. 19' One trust, for his wife's
benefit, was not at issue, and the other was for the benefit of his wife for life,
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remainder to his children (three of whom were not the children of the widow).' 92
The widow was also named as co-executor ofthe estate, together with a lawyer,
and the decedent's brother was named as trustee of the trusts.' 93 The
construction company had significant debt problems because of the poor market
in the early 1980s.194 In order to get financing to develop the real estate, the
widow and her brother-in-law, the trustee, individually formed a new, debt-free
corporation.' 95 The estate (through the co-executors, the widow and the lawyer)
sold the land to the new corporation, so the land was never placed into the
trust. 96 The new corporation developed and sold the property. 97 Two of the
stepdaughters who were remainder beneficiaries sued, claiming that the sale of
the land to the new corporation was a breach of the fiduciary duties of the coexecutors and of the trustee. 198 The lower court held in favor of the defendant
fiduciaries, finding that the remaindermen did not have standing because any
profits from the development and sale of the land would have been trust income,
and finding the widow as the sole income beneficiary.' 99 Furthermore, the lower
court held that the fiduciaries did not engage in self-dealing and that there was
no loss because the property had been sold to the new corporation for a fair
price.2" The lower court dismissed the claims against the lawyer co-executor
because he had no other interest in the transactions and found that the brother
trustee and the widow (shareholders of the corporate buyer) were not guilty of
self-dealing because neither of them could have caused the sale unilaterally.2"'
The trustee could not have forced the sale because the land was still in the estate,
and the widow could not have forced the sale because she was only a coexecutor. 202
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the lower court applied the wrong
standard to determine whether self-dealing had occurred. 2 3 The trial court
applied the standard of duty of a corporate director, who is protected from a
claim of self-dealing ifa sufficient number ofdisinterested directors approve the
transaction." If the transaction has not been approved by enough disinterested
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directors, then the interested director must prove that the transaction was fair."'
As the court noted, unlike corporate law, self-dealing by a trustee is "virtually
prohibited." 2" Under trust law principles, it was irrelevant that the widow and
the brother could not sell the land alone because a trustee cannot purchase trust
property even if the sale is conducted by someone else. 7 Self-dealing occurs
"when the fiduciary has a 'personal interest in the subject transaction of such a
substantial nature that it might have affected his judgment in material
connection."' 2 °8 Furthermore, the fiduciaries' argument that the sale was
necessary because of the difficulty in obtaining financing to develop and sell the
property was also irrelevant. Although that may be true, the fiduciaries still had
to obtain advance approval of the beneficiaries or of a court.2" Because the lots
already hadbeen sold to third parties, the court agreed that the beneficiaries were
entitled to the profits received by the fiduciaries as a result of the sale.210 The
court held, however, that, because the new corporation had made significant
improvements to the property before selling it, including building houses on the
lots, the profit on sale ofthe property was due to the new corporation's efforts.2t
Therefore, the trust was only entitled to the difference between the fair market
value of the land and the price paid by the new corporation.2 2 The burden of
proving the fairness of the purchase price was, however, on the fiduciaries rather
than on the beneficiaries, as the trial court had held.2 3 Therefore, the fiduciaries
were able to defend the transaction on remand on the basis of fairness of
purchase price, which normally is not available under the no further inquiry rule.
However, the court arrived at that result by holding that the fiduciaries would
have received no profit unless the price was unfair, and recission of the
2 14
transaction was impossible because of bona fide purchasers.
In Estate ofSchulman,25 Schulman, an accountant, was trustee of several
2t6
trusts established for the daughter and grandchildren of his friend and client.
The trusts held the shares of a family corporation, which, in turn, held
marketable securities and was essentially a personal holding company for the
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family.2 7 The daughter held forty-four percent of the shares outside of the
trusts." Schulman acted as secretary to the family corporation, and there was
a finding that he exclusively conducted the company's business and was in sole
control of investment decisions." 9 He loaned most of the family corporation's
assets to another company in which he was a shareholder and director, and
subordinated the loan from the family corporation to a bank loan." The
borrower company went bankrupt, leaving the majority of the loan to the family
corporation unpaid.' Schulman's estate argued that the loans were made in
Schulman's role as corporate officer of the family corporation and his actions,
therefore, should be judged under the business judgment rule.'
The court
disagreed, noting that Schulman acquired control of the family corporation as a
result of his role as trustee and, therefore, had to be held to the standard of
trustee in his actions.'
The UTC presumably would clarify and confirnn the results in Stegmeier
and Schulman, applying a trust standard to the conduct of the trustees in
managing corporate assets held by the trusts. Neither the Code nor its comments
directly address whether the trustee could elect herself as director or officer. The
Code Section states only that the trustee must elect managers consistent with the
beneficiaries' best interests. Professor Bogert noted that the case law on this
issue is "not harmonious." -4 One court that took a strict view that such an action
would be a conflict (and was reversed on appeal) compared it colorfully to
"mirror, mirror on the wall, who's the fairest of them all?"' Another court, in
Estate ofSnapp,2 6 found authority for the trustee to appoint himself president of
the estate's corporations in the trust's broad grant of power to the trustee to
manage the family business.227 The court, however, remanded the case for a
determination of whether the compensation paid to the trustee in his capacity as
president of the companies was excessive.' The facts of that case were unusual
and illustrate how a trustee must be cautious as to whether all beneficiaries
consent to the trustee's actions. The trust in question was set up by the trustee's
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deceased father and was for the lifetime benefit of the trustee's mother,
remainder to the decedent's children.22 After seven years of administering the
trust and running the companies, it was discovered that the deceased father had
another daughter by a previous marriage." ° That daughter, qualifying as a
remainder beneficiary, then challenged the trustee's actions.l'
The extent of a trustee's duty of loyalty when dealing with closely-held
business assets is an evolving issue. The UTC provision gives statutory
clarification to some basic considerations, but, as case law develops in this area,
there may be future opportunities for more extensive statutory coverage.
In summary, the UTC takes a rather restrained approach to refining the duty
of loyalty. It softens the harsh edges of the doctrine but stops short of creating
true safe harbors except for rather mundane transactions. The method used to
soften application of the no further inquiry rule is significant. The rule applies
conclusively to outright self-dealing, i.e., transactions between the trustee and
the trust. It also applies conclusively where the trustee takes an opportunity that
should have been given to the trust.
However, transactions between the trust and a relative or affiliate of the
trustee create only a rebuttable presumption ofvoidability. The trustee can rebut
the presumption by proving that the transaction was not affected by the conflict.
The questions under the case law center around whether the fiduciary's
relationship with the other party to the transaction is close enough. A trustee
who is a majority stockholder in a corporation could not sell trust assets to the
corporation under common law,1 2 but, under the Code, that trustee may be able
to rebut the presumption by showing a lack of influence. The closeness of the
relationship certainly would be relevant in showing a lack of influence, but that
question would not decide the issue as it has under case law. Also,
reasonableness of the terms of the transaction would be a factor in showing lack
of influence, but it would not be the ultimate question. Under common law,
either the nature of the relationship would preclude further inquiry, or, if found
to be not sufficiently close to cause a conflict, the transaction would be judged
as other actions of the trustee, whether or not it was fair and reasonable. The
Code provision that creates the rebuttable presumption is sufficiently broad to
include situations like Rothko and other situations in which there is an incidental
benefit to the trustee. Thus, inRothko, the questions would not be whether there
was self-dealing and, if not self-dealing, whether the transaction was fair.
Instead, the transaction would be presumptively voidable, unless the fiduciaries
could prove that the their judgment was not affected by the conflict.
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The Code selects a list of routine transactions that can be challenged if
unfair but are otherwise permissible. This approach follows the lead of other
codifications of the duty of loyalty but clarifies that the trustee still must act
fairly toward the beneficiary. In other words, the trustee is allowed to be
tempted in these circumstances because these transactions are deemed necessary
for efficient operation of modem trusts. It also should be noted that any
transgressions by the trustee involving these transactions (such as compensation
or loans from the trustee for the protection of the trust) may be easier to spot in
most cases than other breaches of loyalty. Nevertheless, giving into the
temptation is still forbidden. Also, transactions between the trustee and a
beneficiary that do not involve trust property are acceptable if the trustee can
prove fairness. The burden does not shift to the trustee, however, unless the
trustee has obtained an advantage in the transaction that would not have been
available in an arm's length transaction.
The Code further clarifies a trustee's ability to invest in mutual funds, again
authorizing transactions that are beneficial to modem trusts while setting limits
on the trustee to protect the beneficiaries. The Code takes a mild approach to
management of corporate interests held by trusts. It indicates that the stricter
standards of trust duty apply in this area, rather than corporate law, and it does
not expressly forbid or authorize trustees serving as corporate managers but,
rather, establishes the best interests of the beneficiaries as the standard against
which to judge the trustee's actions.
V. CONCLUSION
The UTC's definition of the trustee's duty of loyalty preserves, yet subtly
realigns, the common law definition. Under the common law approach, the
trustee is presumed to be disloyal in transactions between the trust and the
trustee, which is the same result under the UTC formulation. However, for less
direct conflicts, the common law first will judge the significance of the trustee's
interest to determine whether the presumption of a breach of duty applies. If the
interest is deemed too incidental to trigger the presumption, then the transaction
is judged on reasonableness. The UTC asks different questions. If the conflict
is not direct, the question is whether the trustee actually gave into temptation,
and it is the trustee's burden to prove that she did not. Even where the interest
of the trustee is significant, she has the opportunity to rebut the presumption that
herjudgment was affected. She would not have that opportunity under common
law. On the other end of the spectrum, where the interest ofthe trustee was less
significant, the beneficiary fairs better than under common law. The test in those
circumstances shifts under the Code from the common law test ofreasonableness
(which can encompass a broad range) to whether the trustee's judgment was
actually affected, and the fairness of the terms is just one factor. A beneficiary
still could void a transaction that was otherwise arguably "fair" if it could be

2002]

THE DUTY OFLOYALTYAND THE UTC

307

shown that the trustee's personal interests affected her actions as trustee. This
rephrasing of the relevant questions should not increase litigation because the
common law tests are also fact-sensitive, and it is an appropriate shift because
it focuses on what should be the real issue, whether the trustee was in fact
disloyal. The other provisions of the UTC's duty of loyalty provide appropriate
safe harbors for necessary and low-risk conflicts of interest without giving the
trustee carte blanche to serve two masters.

